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The following essay is to be part of an Occasional Paper published by the Erasmus
Institute at the University of Notre Dame. It is drawn from an introduction to a book
currently in progress, How Should We Talk About Religion?, to be based on the
proceedings of a faculty seminar held last summer under the auspices of the Erasmus
Institute at Notre Dame and to be published next year by the University of Notre Dame
Press. (When they become available, full copies of the Occasional Paper and
information on the forthcoming book will be available from the Erasmus Institute,
1124 Flanner Hall, Notre Dame, Indiana 46556-5611, or by e-mail to
Erasmus@nd.edu.) James Boyd White was the director of the seminar; the other
members, drawn from several disciplines and several parts of the world as well, were:
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Luis Bacigalupo, who teaches medieval philosophy at the Catholic University of Peru.
Clifford Ando, a classicist at the University of Southern California.
Scott Appleby, an historian at Notre Dame.
Sabine McCormack, from the Classics and History departments of the
University of Michigan.
Belinda Straight, an anthropologist at Western Michigan Univesity.
Patrich Deneen, a political scientist at Princeton.
Wayne Booth, from the English Department and the Committee on Ideas and
Methods at the University of Chicago.
Eugene Garver, a philosopher from St. John~ University in Collegeville, Minnesota.
Javier Iguiniz, an economist at the Catholic University of Peru.
Ruth Abbey, a political theorist at the University of Kent.
Sol Serrano, an historian from the Catholic University of Chile.
Carol Bier, a curator at the Textile Museum in Washington, D.C.
Jeffrey Kripal, who teaches religious studies at Westminster College.
Luis Gomez, who teaches Buddhist studies and psychology at the
University of Michigan.
Ebrahim Moose, who was trained as a Muslim theologian and teaches
at Stan/ord University.

This project had its genesis in a
faculty summer seminar held in
June 2000 at Notre Dame
University under the auspices of
the Erasmus Institute. Our topic
was how to talk about religion,
particularly in the languages of
our various academic disciplines.
Our experience, supported we think by
that of others, is that it is most difficult to
do this well, whether we are trying to talk
about religion within a discipline, such as
law or psychology or anthropology, or even
in more informal ways, with our friends
and colleagues. There are many reasons for
this: It is in the nature of religious experience
to be ineffable or mysterious, at least for
some people or in some religions; different
religions imagine the world and its human
inhabitants, and their histories, in ways
that are enormously different; and there is

no superlanguage into which all religions
can be translated, for purposes of
understanding, comparison, or mutual
intelligibility. This point can be put even
more strongly: The deepest truths and
commitments of one religion, its
fundamental narratives, are likely to appear
simply irrational, or even weird, to those
who belong to another religious tradition,
or who are themselves without religion;
this means that the attempt to study and
talk about a religion (other than one'.s own)
is likely to have a built-in element of
patronization, at least when one is
studying beliefs one could not imagine
oneself sharing.
Yet it is of enormous importance to
learn to talk about religion well, if only for
the obvious political and practical reason
that religious divisions, both within nations
and among them, are often intractable and
bitter, and mutual understanding very
difficult to attain. And it is hard even to
imagine an intellectually respectable way of
doing this. Think of the anthropologist of
religion for example: Is he or she simply to
assume that there is a cross-cultural
phenomenon called "religion," and if so on
what basis? "Religion" is our word, and
why should we assume that the Samburu
of Kenya, or the Hindus of the Indian
subcontinent, have practices or beliefs that
in any way parallel what we know in the
west? (Perhaps we should use their words,
and see what happens.) Or consider the
psychologist, especially the psychotherapist:
Is he or she to regard the religious beliefs
and experiences of a patient as fantasies
and wishes of a pathological kind, of which
the patient should be cured? Or as healthy
formations, and if so, how can that
position be explained in the language of
psychology' Or think of the historian of
the Middle Ages, interested say in
architecture or philosophy or social life
more generally: How is he to come to
understand the world of religious meaning
in which the people he is describing lived,
and how can he represent it in anything
other than reduced terms? Or: How is the
political scientist or theorist to resist the
tendencies of the field to reduce religion to
its civic utility or to treat it as an object to
be discussed simply in sociological terms?
Or, to shift to another field, how is the
economist to think about the tensions
between the premises of economic thought
and those of the religious life of his own
culture, in which he perhaps participates?
Such are the questions that brought us to
our work together.
The working idea of the seminar was to
collect a dozen or so people from very

different disciplines and backgrounds, and
of different religious outlooks, too, each of
whom in his or her professional work faced
our question in a significant way. Each
member of the seminar was responsible for
leading a two-hour session on his or her
work, beginning with a presentation that
was then the subject of questions and
comments. As we proceeded we found
ourselves engaged in a conversation with
its own shape and life, which continues
today.
Our main object was not to produce a
book, but to educate ourselves and each
other, expanding in various ways our sense
of the reality and complexity of religious
experience and intensifying our sense of
the difficulty and necessity of talking about
it in our various languages and disciplines.
When we finished, we looked back over
what we had done, saw that certain themes
and questions emerged prominently in our
conversations across our lines of difference,
and we came to the conclusion that we did
have at least the beginnings of a book.
Here are the questions that recurred
most prominently in our work:
1. Is reason alone, however defined,
sufficient for a full intellectual, practical,
and imaginative life? To the extent it is
not sufficient, what else is required, and
what relation should it have to reason?
2. How adequate are our languages of
description and analysis for the
representation of religion?
3. To what degree must confrontation with
the religious experience of others be a
challenge to our own commitments whether these are theistic or agnostic or
atheist - in order to be real and valid?
4. Can there be a pluralism that does not
dissolve into universal relativism?
5. To what degree must any attempt to talk
seriously and deeply about religion be
communal, rather than simply the voice
of an individual speaking to the world?
6. What is the significance of the fact that
although religion obviously has its
public face, as a branch of culture, as a
system of thought, and as a set of
practices, it also has a private face, in
the world and mind of the individual
person?
It should be clear by now that the title
of our seminar - How Should We Talk
About Religion? - is to be taken as a
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statement of the problem we collectively
addressed, not as holding out the promise
of a prescriptive answer, offered by any
individual or by us collectively: Each of the
authors had his or her own way of talking
about religion, and the merit of our work
lies to a large part in the diversity of
approach - of discipline and background,
of age and nationality, of religious outlook
and intellectual commitment - reflected
in it. Yet perhaps there is something of an
answer to our question that can be found
in this collection of performances, for we
found that we talked together much better
- more fully, more deeply, more
intelligently - than any of us did alone.
To build on one of the themes identified
above, if we have an answer to the
question "How to talk about religions?"
it is this: In intellectual and personal
community.
For in talking to one another over two
intense weeks we found, not surprisingly,
that our conversation improved
enormously as time went on. We came to
know each other better, and responded to
each other more fully; and as we came to
know and trust one another, we discovered
that a wider range of sentences
became sayable by the speakers and
comprehensible by the listeners. (Perhaps a
wider range of sentences became unsayable
as well.) In some sense, a larger part of the
mind of each of us came to be engaged in
this conversation than is normally the case
in academic life. As we proceeded, the
particularities of each person - in
training, commitment, experience,
disposition - came to be acknowledged as
a necessary part of the conversation itself,
for they were what we brought to it, and
what we were responding to in each other.
We were engaged in a kind of collective
thought, which over time became richer
and deeper. One way to put this is to say
that the question for each of us became not
only how to talk, but how to listen to each
other talk, about religion.
None of this is, I think, surprising, but
it is different from much discourse about
religion. Compare with the kind of
conversation I am describing, for example,
a standard academic attempt to speak on
the subject of religion - as a psychologist,
say, or anthropologist, or theologian, or
sociologist - beginning, as Plato
somewhere has Socrates advise us to begin
every intellectual exercise, with a
definition: "By religion I mean," or "by
Protestantism I mean," or "by
fundamentalism I mean . .. " Here one would
be attempting to speak in a universal voice
68
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to a universal audience, or if not quite
universal, in the voice of a discipline to all
members of the discipline. This kind of
talk is driven by understandable and
meritorious impulses towards clarity,
rationality, and neutrality, and of course the
enterprise can have great value. But we
need to recognize that we may get farther
in a different direction working in a
different mode, the heart of which is the
recognition of particularity: the particularity
of the speaker and the audience, the
particularity of their context, and the
particularity of their subject - which is
not "religion" as a whole, but this or that
practice or belief, these sentences or
actions, this or that way of imagining the
world and acting within it, and as seen
from this or that perspective, as the object
of this or that question cast in this or that
language.
The very fact that we were talking
across lines of discipline and language,
which was from some perspectives
frustrating - we could not assume that
our audience knew what everyone in our

disciplinary audience knows - had the
virtue, among other things, of leading us to
think and talk not only about our subject,
religion, but also about how we were
talking - about the assumptions we were
making and about the terms in which we
cast our thought. All this gave rise to
valuable, if imperfect, self-consciousness
about our own disciplinary assumptions
and habits, what they were and how they
differed from others.
This context made 'it harder than it
often is in an academic setting for each of
us to come up with hardened positions we
were prepared to explicate and defend to
the death. And even if we had had such
positions, the disciplinary context to which
they would have been framed would have
been largely meaningless to the others in
the group. We were thus forced as it were
into a terrain between the languages of our
disciplines, or among them, where none of
us claimed to know much, and all of us
were ready to learn. This was an accident
of our organization, but one that may have
larger lessons for us as a general matter.
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